Control over Natural Resources and Trade: The Venezuelan
Experience by Grisanti, Luis Xavier
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 17
Control over Natural Resources and Trade: The
Venezuelan Experience
Luis Xavier Grisanti
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Trade Commons
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland
Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Luis X. Grisanti, Control over Natural Resources and Trade: The Venezuelan Experience, 4 Md. J. Int'l L. 76 (1978).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol4/iss1/17
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
CONTROL OVER NATURAL RESOURCES AND TRADE:
THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE
Luis Xavier Grisanti*
The nationalization of the oil industry in Venezuela cannot be
regarded as an isolated event. For an industry that provides more than
seventy percent of the government revenues, more than ninety percent of
the foreign exchange earnings and accounts for thirty percent of the
gross domestic product, nationalization could not have been an act of
adventure but an act of great responsibility. The final take-over of the
industry was the logical outcome of a set of policies that fitted an overall
strategy of control initiated during the 1945-48 Administration of
President R6mulo Betancourt and Development Minister Juan Pablo
Perez Alfonzo. However, the basic legal framework with which the
mineral resources were to be exploited had been established earlier
through Sim6n Bolivar's 1829 decree. The decree granted to the state the
sole ownership of mines and "juices of the earth." This same concept was
later recognized by the Hydrocarbons Law of 1920 which stated: "The
right of exploitation does not confer any ownership of the mine . . . nor
does it constitute any division of such ownership which is inalienable and
inprescriptible."
STEPS LEADING TO THE LAW OF
AUGUST 29, 1975
In essence, Venezuela has nationalized her mineral resources since
1829. As a consequence of this inalienability of ownership, a system of
concession was devised to grant individuals or companies the right to
* Office of Petroleum Affairs, Embassy of Venezuela, Washington, D.C.
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exploit the hydrocarbon resources. Other laws and measures which set
the stage for the final take-over of the industry were:
(1) The Hydrocarbons Law of 1943 which established reversion of
concessions within forty years, set royalties and introduced the Income
Tax Law applicable to the oil companies;
(2) The amendments to the Income Tax Law in 1948 establishing
the 50-50 profit sharing principle based on market prices dictated by the
oil concessionaires. The Income Tax Law was amended again in favor of
Venezuela in 1958, 1966, 1970, 1971 and 1975. The income tax rate
reached seventy-two percent of the reference price set by the government
in 1975. This rate was about ninety percent and more of the market
prices;
(3) The creation in 1960 of the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation
and the sponsoring of the formation of OPEC;
(4) The introduction of tax reference values or reference prices for oil
in 1966, devised to calculate income tax revenues of the government
through bilateral consultations between the latter and the oil companies.
Until then, export prices were dictated unilaterally by the oil companies;
(5) The Law of 1970 authorizing the executive branch of government
to set the reference values unilaterally, an initiative that emanated from
the Venezuelan Congress and which had great historical significance to
Venezuela and OPEC as all member countries adopted it later. Until then,
no individual country or group of countries had experienced the right to
set the prices of their raw materials. In Venezuela, some believe that this
decision was "de facto" nationalization;
(6) The Reversion Law of 1971 designed to assure the continuity of
the industry once concessions expired in 1983. Under this law, all plants
and equipment as well as all material assets in general would revert to
the nation in 1983 under proper operational conditions; and
(7) The Law Reserving to the State the Industry of Natural Gas of
1971, and the Law Reserving to the State the Domestic Products Market
of 1973.
The ultimate decision, however, came a year later, in 1974. Only days
after taking office, and a few months after OPEC's realignment of oil
prices, President Carlos Andres Perez announced his government's
decision to nationalize the industry, and proceeded to appoint a
Presidential Reversion Commission of more than 100 high officials from
industry, Congress, government, political parties and academia who were
in charge of drafting the Nationalization Bill. Once the Commission
submitted the draft, it was introduced by the President to Congress in
March of 1975. And on August 29 of that same year, after an intensive
legislative process and debate, Congress passed the Law Reserving to the
State the Industry and Commerce of Hydrocarbons. The law called for the
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creation of Petroleos de Venezuela, the state-owned holding company of
the industry and set January 1, 1976 as the official date for the transfer of
the industry to the state. On that date, Petroleos de Venezuela assumed
full responsibility for the supervision, planning, control and coordination
of fourteen subsidiaries that were the former Creole (Exxon), Shell,
Texaco, Gulf and others.
THE ROLE OF PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S. A.
Administratively, Petroleos de Venezuela has a board of directors
comprised of a president, vice-president, nine directors and five deputies.
In turn, relations with the affiliates are carried out by coordinators in
charge of exploration, production, finance, refining, storage and trans-
port, domestic marketing and human resources.
The administrative and operational structure of the affiliates has
been kept fairly intact, although some changes are taking place as a
result of a policy of consolidation and rationalization. The tax structure
and paying mechanism was maintained with only a minor reduction
designed to accommodate the ten percent net income fee that the
subsidiaries have to pay by law to Petroleos de Venezuela.
COMMERCIALIZATION CONTRACTS AND THE NEED FOR
MARKET DIVERSIFICATION
Before the nationalization, Venezuela signed two-year renewable
commercialization contracts with the former concession holders. Never-
theless, Petroleos de Venezuela has followed an aggressive policy of
market diversification aimed at finding new customers and reaching the
final users of the oil, thus minimizing the use of intermediaries. In 1976,
about twenty percent of the 2,150,000 barrels exported daily were sold to
new clients. In 1977, this figure increased to twenty-five percent or
500,000 barrels per day which were sold to about fifty nontraditional
customers, including about 100,000 barrels per day to state oil companies.
It is worth pointing out that this policy does not imply neglecting
traditional customers. On the contrary, the policy stresses the importance
of reaching the traditional final customers through more direct sales.
TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS AND THE NEED
To BE MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT
Technical assistance contracts were also signed with the foreign oil
companies. These two-year renewable contracts, approximately thirteen
initially, provide the industry with special assistance in fields that range
from exploration to human capital formation.
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The majority of the contracts contemplated the payment of a fixed fee
of twenty cents per barrel for the first two years. Some of the contracts
which expired at the end of 1977 have not been renewed. As it stands
today, contracts have been renewed with Exxon, Shell and Gulf, while
negotiations have continued with Mobil and new contracts may be
negotiated with Texaco and Chevron.
Petroleos de Venezuela and the Ministry of Energy and Mines have
followed a policy of constant improvement of the terms, conditions and
effectiveness of the contracts through thorough evaluations of the
services rendered. As a result, the new contracts signed have included a
five percent reduction in the per barrel fee vis-A-vis the 1976-77 contracts
and the foreign companies' agreement to share the technological services
with some or all of the nationalized operators. This pooling of know-how
provided by the foreign companies will avoid duplication of services and
permit a sort of "horizontal integration" of the services supplies to the
industry.
In the long run, Petroleos de Venezuela through its Research and
Development arm - the Venezuelan Institute of Petroleum Technology
(INTEVEP) - expects to generate most of the technology and expertise
needed. Currently, the Institute possesses 230 highly able professionals
involved in various projects.
PRESENT AND FUTURE TASKS OF THE INDUSTRY
The nationalization process has proceeded rather smoothly. Never-
theless, the industry is currently launching a far-reaching revitalization
scheme that includes all facets of the industry. A $20 billion investment
plan for the next ten to twelve years has been formulated and is presently
being executed.' This figure is about twenty times higher than the total
net book value of the assets of the industry at the end of 1975 which,
incidentally, was used as the basis for compensation of the concession-
aires. The investment is expected to address some of the industry's most
urging needs which are as follows:
Reserves and Exploration
At the end of 1977, proved reserves were placed at 17.9 billion barrels
with a reserve-to-production ratio of about twenty years at current
production levels. However, some twelve billion barrels more are expected
1. The figure is also 7.4 times larger than the new investments in fixed assets
of the 1966-75 period prior to the nationalization. The amount of investments for
that period was $2.7 billion.
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to be recoverable from known existing oil fields by applying techniques of
secondary and tertiary recovery. Therefore, Venezuela has proved and
semi-proved reserves of thirty billion barrels.
An area of possible reserves is the Venezuelan Continental Shelf -
an almost unexplored territory of 500,000 square kilometers. Based on
geological extrapolation of surrounding known land areas and discounted
probability factors, generally light oil reserves of at least ten billion
barrels, and possibly forty billion barrels, can be found there. Exploratory
drilling in the Continental Shelf will be concentrated in Golfo Triste,
Golfo de La Vela (off the western coast) and the Orinoco Delta. Drilling
efforts are also being focused on Lake Maracaibo and the Barcelona and
Maturin Basins.
All these exploration initiatives are taking place within the context of
a policy aimed at finding new light oil reserves. The need to find new
light oil reserves stems from the composition of proved reserves. Of the
17.9 billion barrels of proved reserves, only seventeen percent or three
billion barrels are light oils, twenty-eight percent or five billion barrels
are medium oils and fifty-six percent or ten billion are heavy oils. On the
other hand, the composition of production is just the opposite. In 1976,
production of light oils amounted to thirty-five percent, medium oils were
thirty-eight percent and heavy oils, twenty-seven percent.
There is a high probability that there will be light oil reserves in the
areas mentioned above. Exploratory drilling expenditures have increased
sharply in order to accomplish this goal. In 1976, they were $112 million;
and for 1978, $255 million have been assigned to that objective. These
expenditures are in strong contrast with the $10-15 million yearly
average of the 1959-75 period.
Another effort is being made by Petroleos de Venezuela to correct the
disparity between the composition of reserves and the composition of
production. A policy of attracting heavy oil clients has translated into the
execution of contracts in 1977 for the sale of 60,000 barrels of extra heavy
oil. Furthermore, the change in the refining structure actually in progress
will result in more heayy oil processing capabilities, as will be discussed
later.
The Orinoco Petroleum Belt
In the area of possible heavy oil reserves, Venezuela has the Orinoco
Petroleum Belt. Estimates of reserves have ranged from 700 billion to two
trillion barrels of oil in situ. However, none of the estimates should be
considered final. In fact, a thorough geological survey of this extensive
territory (600 kilometers long and 40-80 kilometers wide) has not been
made. Vast areas remain unexplored even though existence of the belt
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has been known for forty years and production of the Morichal-type
heavy oil has been flowing for years in southern Monagas State.
The giant reservoir contains extra heavy oils - highly sulfurous and
highly viscous - which would have to be upgraded in order to make it a
profitable medium or light oil suitable for conventional refineries. Heavy
crude from the Orinoco Belt was sent to Japan to be tested by Exxon's
"flexicoking" upgrading method and the results have been satisfactory.
No major project is being executed at the moment. However, offers for the
development of the Orinoco Belt have been received from Japan, France
and other countries.
Today, extracting, producing, upgrading and refining the extra heavy
oil is economically feasible and will become more so as prices rise and
technology advances. Nonconventional oils will definitely play a more
important role in supplying future energy needs. Currently, Canada's $2.1
billion, 125,000 barrels per day first commercial-scale oil sands extraction
plant in the Athabasca region is almost completed and synthetic crude oil
from the Athabasca tar sands will start flowing in June 1979. The
Athabasca oils are similar to those of the Orinoco Belt, and a cooperation
agreement between Petroleos de Venezuela and Canada has already been
established.
The Change in the Refining Structure
The 1.5 million barrels capacity of Venezuela's refineries was built by
the foreign oil companies to process light and medium oils that would
satisfy the residual fuel oil market of the Eastern Atlantic Coast of the
United States. For many years, Venezuela supplied most of this market.
Today, Venezuela sends directly, and indirectly, through Caribbean
refineries 900,000 to one million barrels of crude oil and products per day.
By the end of 1977, Venezuela was supplying about thirty-four percent of
the residual market of the Eastern Coast. Nevertheless, the disparity
between the compositions of reserves and production mentioned before
has made it necessary to change the refining structure of Venezuela.
Actually, Venezuelan refineries yield sixty percent of residual fuel oils
and nineteen percent of gasolines as opposed to U.S. refinery yields of
forty-five percent gasolines and only ten to eleven percent of residual fuel
oils.
A $1.63 billion project to increase the product yield is being carried
out at the moment, and once completed, will result in greater heavy oil
processing capabilities and higher gasoline yields will help to alleviate a
booming domestic demand for oil products, particularly gasoline, which
takes up one-half of the 250,000 barrels consumed daily in Venezuela.
Furthermore, domestic demand for petroleum is rising at ten to fourteen
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percent per year and is expected to reach some 500,000 barrels per day in
1985.
The Case of the Domestic Pricing Structure
A domestic pricing structure which is far below international price
levels aggravates the domestic consumption problem. As internal demand
increases and less oil is exported, revenues from diverted exports decrease
with negative consequences to the profitability of the industry. This
subsidization of the domestic market will have to be corrected in the
future.
Consolidation and Rationalization
Ever since the nationalization, Petroleos de Venezuela has been
conducting a policy of consolidation of the affiliates. The consolidation
process decreased the number of affiliates from fourteen to seven. The
smaller units report to the larger ones and the latter, in turn, report to
Petroleos de Venezuela. Further consolidation is forthcoming.
I do not want to end this tight review of the industry without a word
on human resources. At the end of 1977, there were 24,574 trained and
well-experienced professionals. At the time of nationalization, more than
ninety-five percent of the 23,500 personnel was Venezuelan, including a
president of the second largest oil company, Shell (now Maraven), several
vice-presidents and directors. The existence of such an efficient team of
human resources was, perhaps, the major contributing factor in the
success of nationalization.
CONCLUSION
The policies outlined here constitute the basic factors in order for
Venezuela to continue as a reliable and secure supplier of fossil energy
resources to the United States, its main client, and the rest of the world.
I hope this presentation will demonstrate how a developing country
can successfully manage and operate a complex, dynamic capital and
highly skilled labor-intensive industry, the size of the Venezuelan
petroleum industry.
